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A Gendered Analysis of Conditional Cash Transfer
Programmes in Mexico and Nicaragua
S A R A H  B R A D S H AW
Middlesex University, UK
abstract The article explores the implications for gender roles
and relations in Nicaragua of implementing a Conditional Cash
Transfer programme aimed at improving the situation of the
extreme poor. Nicaragua’s programme, the Social Protection
Network/Red de Protección Social (RPS), is modelled on the
Progresa/Oportunidades programme of Mexico and shares
many features in common. Evaluations of Progresa have
suggested positive outcomes for women. However, examination
of the findings highlight some cause for concern particularly
around what inclusion on the programme means for the women
involved. The article explores the consequences of translating
this programme aimed at addressing the structural causes of
poverty into a more overtly neoliberal and neo-conservative
policy context such as that in Nicaragua. It highlights how a key
feature of the RPS is the ‘social adjustment’ of women’s
behaviour for economic growth gains and discusses the possible
consequences for the women included and excluded from the
programme.
keywords Central America, feminization, poverty, PRSP, social
safety nets
In recent years there has been a renewed interest by international develop-
ment agencies in the role of social policy for bringing about poverty reduction
and development goals. The high social costs of the World Bank and
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International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programmes
(SAPs) and continued high levels of poverty across the Third World have led
to the re-emergence of social protection initiatives, particularly in Latin
America. The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have demonstrated
an increasing interest in the role of social policy as a route to reducing poverty,
to the extent that a recent internal World Bank evaluation suggested the need
for the Bank to refocus on economic growth (PovertyNet, 2005). However,
critics have noted that agencies such as the World Bank have tended to merely
‘add on’ social policies to existing macroeconomic policies rather than seek-
ing to redesign them (Elson, 2004: 64). A general process to ‘project-ize’ and
‘micro-tize’ social policy has been noted (Tendler, 2004: 119) that moves away
from universalizing policies designed to tackle the structural problem of
poverty toward a focus on specific targeted actions (ECLAC, 2004). At the
same time a ‘feminisation of responsibility and obligation’ has been docu-
mented where women are assuming greater liability for dealing with poverty
and have progressively less choice other than to do so (Chant, 2006). World
Bank research in the early 2000s highlighted the efficiency gains from chan-
nelling resources through women (World Bank Gender and Development
Group, 2003) and the idea that investing in women is one of the most efficient
routes to ensuring development aims has led to a ‘generalised bid to alleviate
poverty primarily, or even exclusively, through women’ (Chant, 2003a: 27) or
a ‘feminisation of poverty alleviation’ (Chant, 2008).
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) have become a popular policy tool in this
context. CCTs provide cash transfers, most usually to women, that are aimed at
improving the health, nutrition and education of children within the household
and are contingent upon gains in these areas. One of the most successful CCT
programmes in recent years has been the Mexican government’s programme
Progresa (later renamed as Oportunidades). The Mexican government has
made great claims in terms of the role of Progresa/Oportunidades in improving
the well-being of the poor in general and the situation of women and children
in particular (SEDESOL, 2004a, b). This has led the World Bank to promote
Oportunidades as a model on which to base social safety net programmes 
in the countries in which it has a policy influence (SEDESOL 2003). The
Oportunidades model has formed the basis for a key component of the social
safety net provision within the World Bank and IMF sponsored poverty reduc-
tion initiative in Nicaragua. Nicaragua’s social protection network – The Red
de Protección Social (RPS) – has been cited as one of the most successful CCTs
(Rawlings, 2004) and while the RPS is more expensive than Oportunidades to
implement, it has been suggested that the results have been even more impres-
sive (Maluccio and Flores, 2004: 65).
The article considers the implications of implementing an Oportunidades
style CCT programme in the Nicaraguan poverty and policy context. In par-
ticular it examines the potential impact of such an initiative on gender roles
and relations. It begins by providing a brief introduction to the policy context
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that has led to the emergence of CCTs as a popular policy tool, before going
on to examine the components of the Oportunidades programme and the
claims for gender advancement made by the programme to date. The article
then describes the Nicaraguan policy context and the role of the RPS within
this. It subjects the Nicaraguan programme to a gender analysis that high-
lights the possible negative implications for both the women included and the
women excluded from the programme. The article highlights the inherent
gender bias within what is presented as a model for ‘gendered’ social protec-
tion programmes and demonstrates that such inherent biases can be magni-
fied when a poverty alleviation programme designed in one policy context is
translated into a distinct poverty and policy context.
Social Policy in the Development Context
The late 1970s brought cut backs in social expenditure across the developing
world as part of the decade of World Bank and IMF neoliberal reforms
designed to ‘adjust’ economies in the wake of the oil and debt crises. During
the 1980s women were the invisible army who bore the costs of Structural
Adjustment Programmes (Afshar and Dennis, 1992; Elson 1991; Sparr
1994). By the end of the 1980s, however, the need for a social element to
ameliorate the worst effects of SAPs had been recognized (Cornia et al.,
1987). This, coupled with the recognition of the need to integrate poor
women into the market led a number of South American countries to adopt
strategies targeting those groups most clearly excluded or victimized by
SAPs, such as women and female-headed households in a programme 
of what Alvarez (1999) has termed ‘social adjustment’. Recognition of the
limited success of Structural Adjustment, even with a ‘human face’ (Cornia
et al., 1987), and the continued high levels of both poverty and indebtedness
in many countries saw poverty begin to move up the development policy
agenda. During the 1990s, social policy was refashioned to reflect changing
priorities and women became more visible (Molyneux, 2006). In recent years
female poverty has received more policy attention, as has the role of women
in poverty alleviation (Chant, 2008).
In recent years World Bank research has also begun to highlight the
important role women can play in ensuring policy goals are met, recogniz-
ing the link between reduced gender inequality and economic growth
(Dollar and Gatti, 1999; Klasen, 1999) and highlighting the efficiency gains
from channelling resources through women (World Bank Gender and
Development Group, 2003: 15). Chant (2008: 19) notes that dealing with
poverty is ‘arguably as onerous and exploitative as suffering poverty’ and
suggests that instead of development working for women, women are now
working for development. This may help to explain why a recent study by
ECLAC (2004) found that the percentage of women participating in
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poverty reduction programmes was actually much higher than the percent-
age of women identified as poor.
Recognizing women as a more efficient transmission mechanism of
resources, the majority of CCT programmes have targeted women as ‘bene-
ficiaries’ of resources aimed at improving the health and education of the chil-
dren in their care. This targeting rests on the explicit recognition of women’s
greater commitment to the well-being of their families by programmes such
as Oportunidades (Gómez-Hermosillo, 2005; SEDESOL, 2004a). This sug-
gests an implicit understanding also exists that men and male heads do not
show such commitment. Research shows that women tend to use all their
income to improve the situation of the household while men often withhold
income from the household for personal consumption, which places women
and children who depend on that income in a situation of ‘secondary poverty’
(Dwyer and Bruce, 1988). Targeting resources at women is designed to cir-
cumvent the problem of men misusing the resources provided to them and
ensuring they are delivered to the intended, child, recipients.
CCT programmes seek to alter the behaviour of the poor in order that they
are better able to care for themselves. Co-responsibility is a key feature of
programmes such as Oportunidades and this reflects the fact that social secu-
rity is no longer seen as residing solely with the state, and instead now involves
a co-management of risk where the family too must play their part (Molyneux,
2006). Cash transfers are then contingent on the appropriate behavioural
change of poor families, including greater investment in the health and edu-
cation, the human capital, of their children. The ‘good’ behaviour of children
is the responsibility of women as mothers, and as those targeted with the
resources, to ensure. Despite recognition that such targeting exploits the
social image of women and hides the displacement of public responsibilities
to the private arena, ECLAC among others have suggested that women’s
involvement in these programmes may have ‘empowered them and increased
their self-confidence’ (ECLAC, 2004: 55). While women’s ‘empowerment’
may be a potentially positive byproduct of CCT programmes, the advance-
ment of women is not a central aim. As such female participants in CCT pro-
grammes, as Molyneux (2006) suggests, may be at the service of this New
Poverty Agenda rather than served by this agenda.
The Oportunidades Model
Mexico’s economic crisis of 1995 and the resultant rise in poverty led the
Mexican government to progressively change its poverty reduction strategy
ending ‘universal tortilla subsidies’ and instead funding new investment in
human capital (Wodon et al., 2003: 1). The programme was initiated in 1997
and by 1999 operated in 31 of the 32 Mexican states, in 50,000 localities and
2000 municipalities. In 2005, the programme distributed nearly US$3000m to
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its 4,923,941 beneficiary families (SEDESOL, 2004b).1 The president of the
Inter-American Development Bank and the vice president of the World Bank
coincide in their support for the Oportunidades programme (SEDESOL,
2003, 2005a). Evaluations undertaken to date by independent consultants in
general also highlight how successful it has been (see Adato, 2000; Adato et al.,
2000; CIESAS, 2002; Escobar and González de la Rocha, 2003, 2005; Parker
and Skoufias, 2000; Schultz, 2001; Skoufias et al., 2001; Wodon et al., 2003).
The central component of Oportunidades is a cash transfer representing an
average 19.5% of the income of the households in the programme (Hoddinott
et al., 2000). The cash transfers are given to women and are designed to improve
the health of young children, to ensure children enrol and progress through
school and to improve nutritional levels generally. The ‘food grant’ is a fixed sum
transfer but the amount received for education varies, increasing as the child pro-
gresses through grades 3 to 6 of primary school. In secondary school the amount
not only varies by grade but also by sex, with girls receiving a higher grant than
boys. Co-responsibility criteria mean cash is contingent on successful progress
by the children enrolled in the programme in reaching health and education tar-
gets. Aside from ensuring school attendance and accompanying their children
for health checks, cash is also contingent on the women beneficiaries attending
workshops and talks on related health, nutrition and hygiene themes.
Studies of Oportunidades have noted the high time burden of participating
in such programmes (Escobar and González de la Rocha, 2003: 46) and the
fact that compulsory attendance criteria works against women engaged in
income generating activities. A 2002 evaluation of Oportunidades found
women who live in non-nuclear households, including households headed by
women, and those women engaged in productive activities are less likely to be
beneficiaries of the programme (CIESAS, 2002: 39), which is interesting
given the often-assumed status of female-headed households as the ‘poorest
of the poor’ (see Chant, 2003b, 2004; Jackson, 1998). A later evaluation high-
lights how productive and reproductive work of women can lead to their
being thrown out of the programme for non-fulfilment of the programme’s
criteria (Escobar and González de la Rocha, 2005: 56).
There is no question that Oportunidades has produced some impressive
results, for example, 85% increase in the number of young people enrolled in
primary education in rural areas, an increase of 24% enrolment in secondary
schools, a 16% increase in height and weight of children under three years of age
and an 11% decrease in the maternal mortality rate (SEDESOL, 2004b). The
wider implications of these results have also been noted as improving longer-
term efficiency and equity of ‘development’. In terms of the latter, the designers
of Oportunidades claim that the programme brings about affirmative actions to
prevent the violation of the rights of all the population, particularly women
(SEDESOL, 2005b).
The programme highlights the increased enrolment of girls in secondary
school and higher education as exemplifying its promotion of gendered rights.
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This increased enrolment has been achieved through investing 100,000
Mexican pesos more in support of the education of young women compared to
young men. This extra investment not only supports the higher number of
girls in school, but also allows the programme to offer a slightly higher cash
incentive to parents to keep girls in school. The assumption is that education
is less valued for girls than for boys, in particular by men (Adato et al., 2000).
This echoes recent World Bank reasoning that families’ willingness to school,
feed and provide health care to girls is far more strongly determined by income
and the costs of providing these services than is the case for boys (World Bank
Gender and Development Group, 2003). To counter this Oportunidades offers
slightly higher cash transfers to parents to keep girl children in secondary
school, targeting these payments at women. An early study of Oportunidades,
however, demonstrated that women beneficiaries were unaware of the reason-
ing behind the higher grant, understanding the difference in the amount
received to reflect the fact that there were more expenses associated with send-
ing girls to school, such as those related to personal appearance and menstru-
ation (Adato et al., 2000: 78). The incentive is thus lost, since costs related to
girls’ schooling are actually perceived to be higher. Moreover, the programme
may inadvertently reinforce gender stereotyping by being seen to provide for
additional gendered costs associated with personal appearance.
All transfers, not just those related to girls’ education, are deliberately tar-
geted to women and the programme’s authors see this as important for chal-
lenging gender roles and relations (SEDESOL, 2004a, 2005b). Although the
programme does not claim to be primarily concerned with women’s empower-
ment it is suggested that by putting resources in the hands of women and by
‘encouraging women not to turn over the money to their husbands’ the pro-
gramme can be seen to be concerned with empowerment of women, both ben-
eficiary women and, via education, their daughters as future women (Adato
et al., 2000: 52). As Molyneux (2006) notes, the current focus appears to repre-
sent a continuum with earlier Women in Development approaches that sought
to ‘integrate’ women into development without tackling the underlying cause
of gender inequality. Statements such as ‘encouraging women not to turn over
the money to their husbands’ suggest the programme is constructing women,
rather than inequalities of power, as ‘the problem’. The promoters of
Oportunidades, however, claim to address issues of power not only through
monetary transfers to women but by requiring women to leave their homes to
claim the transfers, by encouraging their participation in community meetings,
and by requiring visits to health facilities and in this way they suggest
Oportunidades has the potential to affect women’s bargaining power within the
household (Adato et al., 2000: 3). However, in line with theoretical thinking
around household functioning (Agarwal, 1997; Sen, 1987, 1990), early empiri-
cal findings did not entirely support these claims, finding the monetary trans-
fers to be crucial in bringing about any changes in patterns of decision-making
within households (Adato et al., 2000: 16).
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In terms of decision-making Wodon et al. (2003: 2) suggest that over time,
women became more likely to decide by themselves on the use of their extra
income from the programme. The study by Adato et al. (2000) found a decline
in husbands alone making decisions in a number of areas; medical treatment
for children, school attendance and the purchase of children’s clothing, with
some effect on food expenditure decisions and those around house repairs.
That is, while men may make fewer decisions alone this is in terms of deci-
sions around activities that are traditionally constructed as ‘female’. While
this reduced male influence may reflect a change in gender relations, at the
same time it may reinforce traditional gendered norms and responsibilities,
constructing women as those responsible for ensuring the financial as well as
social care of children and children’s needs.
It could be assumed that Oportunidades has led to increased tensions within
households given these changes and its ‘empowering’ effect on women. However,
all evaluations to date, where relations within households are considered, have
tended to dismiss the notion of increased tension or violence, suggesting, for
example, that there is no evidence of Oportunidades being the cause of violence
within the home only that ‘program requirements may provoke instances of it
[violence] in households where it already exists’ (Adato et al., 2000: 61). That is
among the nearly one third of adult women who report having experienced vio-
lence at the hands of a partner at some time in their lifetime (Ellsberg et al., 1998;
Heise et al., 1999). The study by Escobar and González de la Rocha (2003: 55)
suggests that the greater solidarity between women in the programme actually
allows them to respond better to situations such as instances of violence against
women. Adato (2000: 23) similarly talks of increased solidarity within the pro-
gramme, suggesting the Oportunidades/Progresa programme may to some
extent create a new identity for beneficiaries as ‘Progresa Women’. However,
increased social cohesion within the programme may lead to increased social
divisions outside the programme, as one doctor involved in the programme
notes ‘ … friends or godmothers of each others’ babies have stopped talking to
each other, and since one is in the programme the other one throws garbage at
her … ’ (cited in Adato, 2000: 21).
Studies have attempted to show how tensions caused by the programme have
been reconciled in communities and in the home. In terms of problems in the
home, a health promoter working with Oportunidades notes, ‘The men do
scold them [their wives], but when they come home with the money, they are
very satisfied’. Similarly a beneficiary of the programme notes ‘ … and he says
to me, if you won’t be here to give me the meal it is OK. You just prepare it and
then go’ (cited in Adato et al., 2000: 60). While men may ‘scold’ women they do
allow women to participate, because of the monetary gains this brings. There
appears to be no evidence, however, that they change their own behaviour to
reflect the changing role of their wives. As long as women are fulfilling their
commitments to men and in the home, and are bringing monetary resources to
the household, then it is rational for men to support the programme as the 
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benefits of women’s involvement in Oportunidades will outweigh any costs.
While recognizing the increased workload the programme represents for
women Adato et al. (2000: 53) conclude that this increase in time burden is
‘clearly a price they [women] are willing to pay for domestic harmony’ and see
it as a ‘strategic choice’ on behalf of women. In contrast participants have high-
lighted how they felt discriminated against by the programme’s demands on
their time, that some activities they felt obliged to perform offended their dig-
nity, and have questioned the rather one sided nature of ‘co’-responsibility (see
Molyneux, 2006).
ECLAC (2004: 57) suggest that one of the biggest problems with women
targeted initiatives has been that actions have not recognized unequal power
relations within households and rather that they assume that relations within
the household are equitable. The problem with the Oportunidades model is
not so much that it does not recognize issues of unequal power within house-
holds, but that this recognition is implicit rather than explicit. The targeting
of resources at women is based on notions of how incomes are used within
households, or misused by men within households. It also relies on the
socially constructed altruism of women to make ‘strategic choices’ that better
the welfare of the whole household rather than their own. Targeting resources
at women means that men’s behaviour is implicitly recognized as problematic
but is not addressed, while the personal deprivation suffered by women
through their altruism is not problematized but explicitly reinforced as the
social norm. Rather than tackling the issue of secondary poverty and unequal
power relations, therefore, to some extent Oportunidades presents a model of
how to circumvent the problem. This is a model that has been used as the
basis for a number of CCT programmes, including that of Nicaragua.
Applying the Oportunidades Model: The Red de Protección
Social
THE NICARAGUAN POVERTY AND POLICY CONTEXT
In 1999 the World Bank and the IMF in the face of increasing criticism
around the lack of success of Structural Adjustment programmes launched the
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) initiative. The PRSP process was
said to mark a new era for the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) not
only marking a new closer relationship between the two but also a new rela-
tionship between them and the countries with which they have continued pol-
icy influence under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC II) initiative.
Countries accepted onto the HIPC must be both highly poor and highly in
debt and have spent a minimum number of years implementing a SAP. Once
accepted to be eligible for debt relief and further concessionary funding under
the initiative countries must produce a PRSP. While production of a PRSP is
a condition ‘imposed’ by the IFIs the content of a PRSP is not predetermined
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but rather PRSPs are said to be country owned and designed though national
participatory processes, with the assistance of the World Bank.
This change in the way of doing business is also reflected in what the World
Bank at least suggests should be included in a PRSP. The core elements
include labour intensive economic growth, human capital investment, good
governance and social safety nets for the most vulnerable. Despite the addi-
tion of more ‘social’ elements external analysts have questioned the newness
of the PRSP process suggesting it to continue with, rather than break from,
past policy prescriptions (Booth, 2003; Bradshaw and Linneker, 2003a;
Cammack, 2002). Amidst renewed debates around the ability of economic
growth to reduce poverty and inequality directly (Dollar and Kray, 2000;
Oxfam, 2000; Weisbrot et al., 2000), the inclusion of social safety nets sug-
gests the World Bank does at least appear to have accepted that economic
growth will not instantly ‘trickle down’ to the most vulnerable.
Nicaragua entered onto HIPC II in 2000 and after producing a PRSP
reached full completion point in 2004 (see Bradshaw and Linneker, 2003a, b).
The PRSP mirrors very closely the guidelines laid out by the World Bank and
the policy focus of the IMF. The PRSP of Nicaragua has a strong economic
growth focus, as its name, ‘The Strengthened Strategy for Economic Growth
and Poverty Reduction’, highlights. A review of the PRSP by the Bank and
the Government in 2001 revealed that many of the programmes analysed
lacked a clear target group or poverty focus, and most had no evidence of out-
comes or impact (Vermehren, 2002). The RPS is the project most clearly
aimed at tackling poverty within the PRSP programme, yet it remains low on
the Government’s policy agenda being assigned only 0.6% of resources gen-
erated under the HIPC II debt relief (Overseas Development Institute [ODI],
2005: 4). Introduced in 2000 the pilot phase of the RPS predates the full
PRSP, and, as with Oportunidades, the main source of funding for the RPS is
the Inter-American Development Bank with only a small contribution from
the Nicaraguan Government and now from the World Bank.2 In order to
reach all households in extreme poverty, approximately US$60m would be
necessary per year (Vermehren, 2002). At present the RPS reaches only
around 2.5% of the extreme poor.
The limitations in coverage of the RPS are compounded by selection cri-
teria. The choice of localities for inclusion within the RPS is not only based
on poverty criteria. Those areas deemed sufficiently poor are then screened
according to a number of indicators with the final criteria being the relative
‘productive potential’ of the different areas (Government of Nicaragua,
2002). The economic growth focus even of this social safety net programme
is clear, and stands in contrast to the poverty focus of the Oportunidades pro-
gramme. An official of Oportunidades recently described Oportunidades
related programmes as ‘designed to deal with structural poverty. They are
static programs. The question is how, when and even whether you should
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take someone off a program’ (IDBAmerica, 2005). In contrast in the RPS
each beneficiary family is enrolled for a set period of three years. As such the
RPS is clearly a targeted micro project within a wider set of economic growth
policies, rather than a universalizing poverty reduction policy as envisaged by
those who designed the Oportunidades programme upon which it is based.
However, despite these limitations, and although the RPS is more expen-
sive than Oportunidades to implement, it has been suggested that the results
have been even more impressive (Maluccio and Flores, 2004: 65). An inde-
pendent evaluation of the pilot phase concluded that the RPS produced a
‘massive’ average net increase in school enrolment of 17.7 percentage points.
In health, achievements included a 5% decline in the number of children
whose growth was stunted, something that they note very few programmes
have managed to achieve in such as short time (Maluccio and Flores, 2004:
64). The only existing qualitative evaluation of the programme also concludes
that the RPS has made a ‘profound’ difference in the lives of the beneficiaries
and their children (Adato and Roopnaraine, 2004: 97).
THE RED DE PROTECCIÓN SOCIAL
While coverage of the RPS is limited over both space and time, for those that
do benefit from it, the benefits, both cash and in-kind, are quite substantial.
The RPS provides three types of grants:
• Education grant, US$15 every two months, plus an additional US$25 dollars
per year, for each child enrolled in school, for the purchase of school supplies.
• Food security grant of US$42 every three months, which is reduced to
US$36 and US$32 dollars during the second and third year respectively.
• Health grant of up to US$90 per family per year to cover payments to pri-
vate providers of health-related services (ODI, 2005: 2).
Pilot households initially received cash transfers of an average 18% of
household income, an amount similar to the transfers received under
Oportunidades. These transfers were linked to displaying ‘good’ behaviour,
such as enrolling children in school and ensuring vaccinations are up to date.
However, transfers were not linked to inflation and their value declined by
8% during the first two years of implementation (Maluccio and Flores, 2004:
8). Moreover, the perceived success of the RPS during the pilot phase led its
designers and funders to conclude that targets could be reached in a more
‘cost effective’ manner (Inter-American Development Bank [IADB], 2003)
finding that families would change their behaviour to suit the programme’s
objectives with very little incentive (International Food Policy Research
Institute [IFPRI], 2005). Accordingly, during phase II the amount of the cash
transfers received by a household declines over the three years they are
enrolled in the programme, resulting in a loss of US$182 per household in
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phase II of the project (compared to households in phase I) or a near 30%
decline in cash transfers. Studies of Oportunidades suggest that the cash
transfer might be key for bringing about changes in gendered decision-
making in the household. The lower cash transfers in the RPS may therefore
have important consequences in terms of bringing the changes in gender roles
and relations alleged to have occurred through Oportunidades.
The Government’s documentation around the RPS promotes explicitly the
need to change the behaviour of families (Government of Nicaragua, 2002)
and the need to promote a ‘responsible attitude’ among families (IADB,
2003). The finding that families would ‘change’ their behaviour with very lit-
tle incentive calls into question the notion underlying the programme that
families do not know how to behave and suggests not a lack of willingness to
display ‘good’ behaviour but the lack of resources that enable them to do so.
For example, studies from Nicaragua highlight how the poor do value educa-
tion, including education for girls (Bradshaw, 2002a; CIET–CCER, 2001).
It is interesting to note that why poor women value education may differ
from why the authors of safety net programmes value education. For the lat-
ter the focus on investment in education is on productivity gains to be had
from a healthy and educated work force, that is, an economic growth focus.
However, studies suggest education is valued by Nicaraguan women in social
as much as economic terms. For young men it is seen as important in terms of
what they will not become, rather than what they will be enabled to become,
that is, education is seen as important to ensure young men do not become
‘delinquents’ or enter into gangs. In terms of young women the focus is on
ensuring young women can ‘look after’ or ‘defend’ themselves in later life and
not be ‘taken in’ or ‘fooled’ by others, most notably men; the notion that,
‘When you know how to read and write you learn how to work and they [men]
can’t fool you’ (Bradshaw, 2002a: 29). Adato et al. (2000: 74) similarly found
that while women in Oportunidades ranked employment as the main positive
outcome from educating girls this was seen as important not primarily for the
additional income it would bring, but in the situation of marriage failure.
Hence among women beneficiaries education is seen as important in relation
to preventing the bad behaviour of boys and in relation to the future perceived
bad behaviour of men, rather than necessarily as a good thing in itself.
Unlike Oportunidades, that seeks to promote the education of girls
through providing higher scholarships for girls in secondary school, the RPS
does not provide higher school grants for girls. The only ‘gender’ focus of
the RPS comes from its focus on mothers as the ‘beneficiaries’ of cash trans-
fers. Mimicking Oportunidades, it is women that have been targeted by the
RPS as the receivers of the programme’s resources, ‘motivated by the evi-
dence that resources controlled by women translate into greater improve-
ments in the well being of children and the family’ (IADB, 2003: 2, author’s
translation). RPS documentation is clear about why women are being
targeted in the programme, noting that the aim is to promote the ‘develop-
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ment’ of women in order to ‘consolidate the family unit’ (Government of
Nicaragua, 2002: 27).
The Inter-American Development Bank who fund the RPS suggest that the
programme ‘directly empowers’ its female beneficiaries (IADB, 2003). They
go on to note that this is through building women’s knowledge and skills so
that they can be ‘pro-active’ in improving their families’ health, nutrition and
education. From the outset the RPS very explicitly constructs women as
mothers, as objects of reproduction rather than as subjects of development.
The RPS implicitly suggests that those women targeted need to learn to be
better mothers, since transfers are dependent on their attending sessions
focussed on better child care and family hygiene, as well as sessions on family
planning. The RPS promotes a notion of what it means to be a ‘good’ mother,
and does this within the context of promoting the family and family values.
The Nicaraguan Government pledges to promote, strengthen and protect the
family unit and family unity, re-establishing the values and morals of families
(Government of Nicaragua, 2003). The focus on family and family values
must be understood within the socio-political context of the country and the
growing influence of the Church on politics and political decision-making.
This power is witnessed by the fact the Church was able to ensure a recent sex
education manual was banned from schools, despite the fact it was govern-
ment sponsored, attacks on women’s groups and members of the women’s
movements and by the recent vote by parliament to revoke the law allowing
therapeutic abortion (see Bradshaw, 2006; Bradshaw et al., 2002).
As with Oportunidades the programme reinforces rather than challenges
existing gendered divisions and any change that may come about for women
will be within these gendered norms of behaviour. The independent evalua-
tion has noted some extreme actions have been taken by some beneficiaries to
comply with the behaviour requirements of the programme (see Bradshaw
and Quirós Víquez, 2003). Cash transfers received by women are in part
designed to ensure the improved nutrition of children in the household. In
the pilot phase to continue benefiting women had to ensure a certain level of
weight gain by their babies. Although this conditionality has since been
dropped some women still appear to think that they must ensure a target
weight is met in order to continue in the programme. There have been
reported incidents of ‘overfeeding’ children just before a health visit in order
to reach the set target, and high levels of stress for beneficiaries mindful of
retaining related cash benefits (IFPRI, 2005: 3).
While targeting resources to women may increase their access to resources
it may not increase their control over these resources. IFPRI (2005: 2) notes
that men reported that with the transfers and related higher spending on food
they ate better and had more energy to work. In terms of its impact on men,
while the IFPRI study highlights that the RPS is not a disincentive to work, it
notes that men have been able to spend more time working their own plots of
land and working closer to home ‘rather than having to travel long distances
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in search of wage labour’ (IFPRI, 2005: 2). This seems to suggest that the cash
women receive through the RPS to some extent is being used to compensate
for men’s reduced waged labour. Women reported that the RPS allowed them
more time to spend on childcare (IFPRI, 2005: 2) presumably also through
reducing income-generating activities.
The household dynamics that occur when new monetary resources or a
new source of monetary resources are introduced into the home are little
studied and little understood in the present policy context. One study of
Oportunidades noted that women had been using the cash transfers they
received to buy things that in the past they would have asked their husbands
to buy; however, the study concluded the prevalence of this was low and evi-
dence anecdotal (Adato et al., 2000). Existing research from Mexico might
call into question this conclusion (Chant, 2003b), as would recent research
from Nicaragua (Bradshaw, 2002b). In the Nicaraguan study, in the commu-
nities surveyed 43% of women reported that their partner withheld earnings
for personal consumption, which in 1 in 10 households represented 50% of
his income. Perhaps more importantly women engaged in income-generating
activities were more likely to report these high levels of income being with-
held compared to women who did not bring money into the home. That is
the study suggests that when women bring resources into the household
rather than seeing this as complementing their own incomes, men may view
this as substituting for them, withholding an equivalent proportion of their
own income as a consequence. As such those within the targeted households
may not be necessarily economically better off through participating in the
programme as while overall household income increases, income available to
women and children may stay constant or increase less.
Models of household functioning suggest monetary contribution to the
household in part determines the ability to make decisions about the house-
hold (see Agarwal, 1997; Sen, 1987, 1990) and as such women’s non-financial
position may improve within the household through the access to resources
participation in the programme brings. However, what is important in deter-
mining relative ‘bargaining power’ is not monetary contribution per se, but
the value placed on this contribution by those in the household. Relative value
or worth of each member, as they themselves and as others perceive this, is the
key factor in determining bargaining power. There are very few studies that
have considered how the way income is generated affects the relative value
placed on that income within the household. A study of reconstruction proj-
ects post-hurricane Mitch in Nicaragua (Bradshaw, 2001) suggests that
money received by women through participation in reconstruction projects
was not valued highly by men or by the women themselves. As such the wider
social benefits for women from their participation in projects was questioned.
Limited benefits for women from their participation in projects may be com-
pounded in the case of projects like the RPS by the fact the provision of basic
household goods is being constructed through the design of the programme as
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the responsibility of women. This ‘feminisation of obligation’ may bring a
decline in the value placed on its fulfilment relative to other household obliga-
tions that continue to be constructed as male and there may be little change to
the relative position of women and men within the home. However, at the
same time the programme’s design implicitly constructs women within the
programme as having and developing certain characteristics or behaviours dis-
tinct from and better than women outside the programme. These characteris-
tics focus on behaviour associated with ‘good’ mothering, such as breast
feeding or family hygiene. Those outside the programme may become under-
stood by what they are not, or as ‘bad’ mothers and somehow lesser women. If
those outside the programme are women involved in income-generating activ-
ities and/or female heads of household, such programmes may further reinforce
existing divisions and notions of what is acceptable and, more importantly, what
is not acceptable behaviour for women.
Conclusions
This article has examined two Conditional Cash Transfer programmes deemed
highly effective by their authors and supporters. The Oportunidades programme
in Mexico has been promoted by many as a blueprint for other interventions and
has been used as a model for the World Bank backed Red de Protección Social
in Nicaragua. Both have produced some impressive results in terms of school
enrolment and child and maternal health and made some impressive claims
about their empowering effect on women. Closer examination of claims around
women’s empowerment, however, suggests a need for caution.
The programmes do recognize internal household power relations in that
the focus on women stems from an implicit understanding that at times men’s
socially constructed behaviour has a key role to play in producing and repro-
ducing low levels of household welfare. Targeting resources at women means
that men’s socially constructed ‘masculine’ behaviour is implicitly recognized
as problematic but is not addressed, while the personal deprivation suffered
by women through their socially constructed altruism is not problematized
but explicitly reinforced as the social norm. Women are presented as the
‘solution’ to the (male) problem. In order to circumvent the much harder task
of changing men’s behaviour, and society’s view of this behaviour that allows
it to be perpetuated, they are the ones targeted with resources and contingent
responsibilities for behavioural change.
The criticisms economic restructuring received as a policy tool has led to a
focus on combining the economic with the social, and a ‘social restructuring’
to change the expectations and behaviour of the poor. Women are being tar-
geted as those responsible for ensuring these changes, both their own and
those of the future generation. Behaviour change is the key to recent World
Bank backed Conditional Cash Transfer programmes, which seek to provide
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short-term poverty alleviation that brings about investment in human capital
and allows long-term economic growth gains. Women have been given the
responsibility to ensure these changes are achieved and the RPS in Nicaragua
is a good example of how social policy interventions are being used to bring
about a wider economic growth aim and how women are being used within
these interventions. In the case of Nicaragua, however, women’s responsibil-
ities go further than ensuring household investment in human capital and
must be understood within the wider socio-political context that promotes
notions of re-establishing the values and morals of families and consolidating
the family unit. As such the women beneficiaries are being constructed as
mothers, as ‘good’ mothers and as modelling appropriate female behaviour. In
a world of binary opposites this naturally constructs those not in keeping with
the norms the programme is seeking to create as ‘bad’ mothers and somehow
lesser or deviant women. The potential economic growth gains from this
marriage of the social with the economic come at a cost. This cost is the pres-
ent and possibly future well-being of women, as present day social adjustment
policies reduce the chances for the equitable development of women in much
the same way as the structural adjustment policies of the past did.
acknowledgements
This article builds on a paper written in discussion with Ana Quirós Víquez and ben-
efits greatly from her knowledge and understanding of the Nicaraguan context. An
earlier version of this article was presented at Middlesex University’s Social Policy
Research Centre seminar series and benefited from the insightful comments of vari-
ous participants. Thanks are also due to Sylvia Chant and Brian Linneker for their
helpful advice and comments. This study was made possible by the continuing finan-
cial support of Progressio/International Cooperation for Development, UK.
notes
1. Data and documents available from: http://www.progresa.gob.mx/
2. The first phase (the pilot phase) of the RPS was implemented from 2000 to the
end of 2002, and Phase II (the expansion phase) started in 2003. The first phase
reached 10,093 families, in six municipalities, in two departments of the country
(Madriz and Matagalpa). A positive evaluation of the pilot phase triggered the
expansion of the programme reaching a further 12,500 families (IADB, 2003).
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résumé
De l’ajustement Structurel à l’ajustement Social: Une Analyse
de Genre des Programmes de Transfert Conditionnel de
Liquidités au Mexique et au Nicaragua
Ce papier examine les implications pour les rôles et les rapports de genre au Nicaragua
de mettre en œuvre un programme de transfert conditionnel de liquidités, qui aurait
comme objectif l’amélioration des circonstances des personnes extrêmement pauvres.
Le programme au Nicaragua, la ‘Red de Protección Social’ (RPS), se base sur le pro-
gramme ‘Progresa/Oportunidades’ du Mexique, et les deux programmes partagent
beaucoup de caractéristiques. Des évaluations réalisées sur le programme ‘Progresa’
ont prévu des résultats positifs pour les femmes. Cependant, une étude de ces résultats
souligne quelques raisons pour s’inquiéter, surtout par rapport aux implications pour
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les femmes qui participent dans le programme. Le papier examine les conséquences de
convertir ce programme (qui compte s’adresser aux causes structurales de la pauvreté)
en un contexte de politique manifestement néolibéral et néo conservatif comme celui
au Nicaragua. Le papier explique qu’une caractéristique principale de la ‘RPS’ est l’a-
justement social du comportement des femmes pour des profits de croissance
économique, et il discute des conséquences possibles pour les femmes qui participent
dans le programme ainsi que pour celles qui y sont exclues.
resumen
Del Ajuste Estructural al Ajuste Social: Un Análisis de Género
de los Programas de Transferencia Condicional de Dinero
Realizados en México y Nicaragua.
Este documento examina las implicaciones de poner en uso un programa de
Transferencia Condicional de Dinero para relaciones de género en Nicaragua, siendo
ello un intento para mejorar la situación de las personas extremamente pobres. El pro-
grama en Nicaragua, llamado la ‘Red de Protección Social’ (la RPS) se base en el programa
‘Progresa/Oportunidades’ que existe en México, y ambos programas comparten muchas
características en común. Evaluaciones realizadas sobre ‘Progresa’ han sugerido que
existe la posibilidad de resultados positivos para mujeres. Sin embargo, un examen de
los datos destacó varias razones para preocuparse, especialmente sobre lo que significa
la inclusión en el programa para las mujeres implicadas. El documento examina las
consecuencias de convertir este programa – que intenta dirigirse sobre las causas
estructurales de la pobreza – en un contexto de política abiertamente neoliberal y neo-
conservador, como en Nicaragua. El estudio muestra también que una característica
principal de la RPS es el ajuste social respecto al comportamiento de las mujeres en las
ganancias de crecimiento económico; discute además las posibles consecuencias para
las mujeres que están implicadas o excluidas del programa.
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